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Medical reversal occurs when a new clinical trial — superior to predecessors by virtue of bet-
ter controls, design, size, or endpoints — contradicts current clinical practice. In recent years,
we have witnessed several instances of medical reversal. Famous examples include the
class 1C anti-arrhythmics post-myocardial infarction (contradicted by the CAST trial) or rou-
tine stenting for stable coronary disease (contradicted by the COURAGE trial). In this paper,
we explore the phenomenon of medical reversal. The causes and consequences are dis-
cussed. Conflicts of interest among researchers and an unyielding faith in basic science are
explored as root causes of reversal. Reversal harms patients who undergo the contradicted
therapy during the years it was in favor and those patients who undergo the therapy in the
lag time before a change in medical practice. Most importantly, it creates a loss of faith in
the medical system by physicians and patients. The solution to reversal is upfront, ran-
domized clinical trials for new clinical practices and a systematic method to evaluate prac-
tices already in existence.
In medicine, therapies as well as diag-
nostic and screening tests decline in popu-
larity  for  two  reasons.  The  first  is  the
phenomenon of replacement: A practice is
supplanted by one that works better. Re-
cently, the low molecular weight heparins
have replaced coumadin in the treatment and
secondary prevention of deep vein throm-
bosis among cancer patients [1] and proton
pump inhibitors have replaced histamine
H2-receptor antagonists in the treatment of
most patients with gastroesophageal reflux
disease [2]. 
The second phenomenon is reversal: A
medical practice falls out of favor not by
being surpassed, but when we discover that
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achieve its intended goal or carrying harms
that outweighed the benefits. Although this
phenomenon should be rare in the age of ev-
idence-based  medicine,  it  is  ubiquitous.
Common use of avandia [3], ezetimibe [4],
atenolol [5], hormone replacement therapy
[6], and the class 1C antiarrhythmic agents
[7] all stopped when trials showed they were
either ineffective or harmful. Reversal not
only  affects  medications.  Previously  ac-
cepted indications for surgical and medical
procedures also have been abandoned. In
2009, stenting for renal artery stenosis was
shown to be ineffective for many patients by
the Angioplasty and Stenting for Renal Ar-
tery Lesions (ASTRAL†) trial [8], and in
2007,  the  Clinical  Outcomes  Utilizing
Revascularization  and  Aggressive  Drug
Evaluation (COURAGE) [9] trial found no
benefit to support percutaneous coronary in-
tervention (PCI) (versus optimal medical
therapy) in most patients with stable coro-
nary artery disease. In these cases, reversal
does not mean that for every indication and
purpose the therapy in question was shown
not to work, but simply that it was contra-
dicted for key indications.
A comparison of replacement and re-
versal invites several questions. While the
former represents a logical progression in
medical care, the latter reveals frequent mis-
steps. Atenolol, a popular antihypertensive
and trial standard, dominated medical prac-
tice for many years. In 2004, the Losartan In-
tervention for Endpoint reduction (LIFE)
study suggested that not all antihypertensives
were the same [10]. Losartan, the angiotensin
receptor blocker, significantly outperformed
atenolol for those things that mattered: car-
diovascular endpoints and mortality. Curi-
ously, both drugs had the same effect on
24-hour blood pressure [11]. Whether the re-
sults were due to a benefit of losartan or a
weak effect of atenolol was debated [12]. A
meta-analysis to resolve the dispute showed
that treatment with atenolol carried equiva-
lent mortality as placebo [5]. Atenolol has
subsequently fallen out of favor.
In our previous work, we coined the
term “medical reversal,” defining it as “the
phenomenon of a new trial — superior to
predecessors because of better design, in-
creased power, or more appropriate controls
— contradicting current clinical practice”
[13]. In this essay, we provide the first sus-
tained account of the key issues surrounding
reversal. We argue that the phenomenon of
reversal does exist, that it is different from
replacement, and that its consequences are
serious. We will outline what we believe the
current philosophy is toward adopting new
technologies and suggest that it be reconsid-
ered. A certain amount of reversal is un-
avoidable  in  medicine,  as  with  any
statistically driven science, but there are real
ways reversal can and should be lessened.
ReveRsAl exisTs
The phenomenon of reversal is real, and
examples abound in recent years. A few
striking ones follow. In the late 20th century,
sudden cardiac death, particularly during the
vulnerable period after myocardial infarc-
tion,  was  deemed  a  “world  wide  public
health  problem”  [14].  A  type  of  heart
rhythm, premature ventricular contractions
(PVCs), was thought to contribute to such
deaths [15]. A new generation of antiar-
rhythmic therapy was developed with the
ability to suppress PVCs up to 85 percent of
the  time  [16].  Cardiologists  began  using
these medications in widespread fashion. In
the late 1980s, the Cardiac Antiarrhythmic
Suppression Trial (CAST) was conducted to
assess the safety of what was then common-
place [7]. Interestingly, recruitment for the
trial was hindered by physicians who re-
fused to let patients undergo randomization
with a 50 percent chance of not receiving
these medications [17]. Fortunately, the trial
was completed and showed that these drugs
(encainide, flecainide, and later, moricizine)
conferred greater mortality than placebo,
and their use was curtailed for this indica-
tion.
Vertebroplasty, the injection of medical
cement into fractured bone, achieved wide-
spread use without good evidence that it
worked. First described in the late 1990s
[18], vertebroplasty quickly gained popular-
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27,000 times in the United States [19]. A
pair of articles published in the New Eng-
land Journal of Medicine in 2009 conclu-
sively showed that the procedure was no
better than placebo by analyzing the out-
comes of patients randomized to vertebro-
plasty or a sham procedure [20,21].
Finally, in what remains a contentious
issue, routine mammography screening for
women in their 40s was questioned in 2009
[22]. The  U.S.  Preventive  Services Task
Force (USPSTF) “recommends against rou-
tine  screening  mammography  in  women
aged 40 to 49 years.” That change from
2002 guidelines was in large part based on a
randomized controlled trial (RCT) of mam-
mography that appeared in The Lancet in
2006 [23]. It compared 54,000 women who
were offered mammograms starting at age
39 with 107,000 women who were not of-
fered them. It was large, well-done, and
likely the best study to address this issue. It
showed only a small decline in the breast
cancer death rate after 10 years, which failed
to meet significance. Overall, mortality of
women in this age group did not change.  
Each of these examples represents a
medical practice not surpassed by an alter-
native (replaced) but instituted in error (re-
versed). Atenolol may lower blood pressure,
but is no better than placebo in increasingly
survival. Class 1-C antiarrhythmics, used as
described, increase mortality. Vertebroplasty
is no better than sham-vertebroplasty in di-
minishing pain or promoting spine stability.
And, because mounting data suggest that
mammographic screening does not benefit
women in their 40s, screening guidelines are
changing. While one may disagree with the
portrayal of any particular example, it seems
implausible that one can disagree with every
example.  
Others have tried to quantify the rate of
contradiction in medical literature. Ioanni-
dis [24] has shown that 16 percent of highly
cited articles were contradicted by future
studies. In our previous work, we examined
a large collection of high-impact literature
and  found  that  among  articles  making  a
claim regarding a medical practice, 13 per-
cent were medical reversals [13]. Reversal
is not a rare occurrence.
Why is ReveRsAl dANgeRous?
Reversal differs from replacement in
that it produces three perils. First, reversal
implies mistake or harm to patients cared for
under the old model. The abandoned prac-
tices were ineffective or harmful. The cases
of CAST and Avandia demonstrate harms,
while  COURAGE  and  Atenolol  suggest
only the harm of misplaced financial and so-
cial resources. This cannot be said about re-
placement.  Patients  who  received  an
ultimately replaced practice were given the
best care of the time, an improvement over
the prior era. It is not a mistake that they did
not receive what was yet to be developed.
When it comes to replacement, harm occurs
only if novel, more effective treatments are
subject to unnecessary delay.  
Second,  removing  a  once-common-
place practice can be more difficult than
imagined. Adherence  to  the  contradicted
claim furthers malfeasance. The idea that
beta-carotene could diminish cancer gained
popularity in the early 1980s [25]. By the
mid-1990s, however, three randomized con-
trolled  trials  overturned  the  claim
[26,27,28]. However, nearly a decade passed
before counterarguments were uncommon
in the literature [29]. The use of routine PCI
in  the  population  contradicted  by  the
COURAGE trial continues. Finally, routine
use of pulmonary artery catheterization con-
tinues, despite being seriously challenged in
1996 [30] and further discredited in 2005
[31,32].
There are several reasons why discred-
ited practices remain in place. Financial re-
wards certainly play a role. One group tried
to understand the characteristics of papers
that  disagreed  with  the  findings  of
COURAGE.  They  made  the  observation
that among articles expressing reservations
about the results, they were more likely to
have an interventional cardiologist as corre-
sponding author than those that were unre-
served [33]. While it is easy to attribute a
portion of blame to financial conflicts of in-
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nents have little to gain monetarily (as with
beta carotene), they remain steadfast. Sion-
tis et al. make a similar observation, noting
that “the mere wish to defend one’s practice,
procedures, and scientific beliefs” may be
sufficient for continuing to support a dis-
credited practice [33].
Third, reversal undermines trust in the
medical system. In the case of hormone re-
placement therapy (HRT) — once thought
to be beneficial for reducing a woman’s risk
of heart disease while treating menopausal
symptoms and contradicted by the Womens’
Health Initiative — patients report feeling
“furious” with doctors who “pushed” ther-
apy upon them [34]. The pharmaceutical
company Wyeth, maker of Prempro, has
been sued for overstating the benefits of
HRT and understating its risks, and court
documents reveal questionable marketing
practices by the drug maker [35]. Loss of
trust  in  the  institution  occurs  not  only
among patients, however, but among doc-
tors as well. In the wake of the breast can-
cer  screening  controversy,  the American
College  of  Radiology  and  the American
Cancer Society criticized the USPSTF. Pa-
tients and doctors report that they plan to
continue to screen the population that does
not benefit. Loss of trust is an immeasurable
harm, whose effects are multifaceted and
enduring.
WheRe does ReveRsAl coMe
fRoM?
When it comes to new medical prac-
tices, the lower the standard for a therapy’s
acceptance, the greater the chance for future
reversal. There are several reasons why we
do not perform large randomized controlled
trials (RCTs) powered for hard endpoints be-
fore every therapy is adopted. Chief among
them are cost, the desire not to delay poten-
tially beneficial therapy, and an unyielding,
and perhaps unjustified, confidence in basic
science  models  and  surrogate  outcomes.
Often, therapies are promoted because they
should work (the pathophysiologic model is
compelling) or because a surrogate marker
(used instead of a clinical endpoint because
it makes a trial easier to run and cheaper)
shows improvement. The examples preced-
ing argue that such data does not always
hold up.
Of course, there is a second and more
cynical interpretation. Financial incentives
are strongly aligned to promote new tech-
nologies. From a research standpoint, conflict
of interests among trialists, industry-spon-
sored studies (utilizing favorable, but flawed
methodology), and industry-sponsored eco-
nomic analyses (with favorably biased re-
sults)  all  encourage  wrongful  optimism,
facilitating approval [36-53]. Litigation that
has arisen out of reversal has enhanced our
understanding of this phenomenon. Such pro-
ceedings  have  uncovered  withheld  safety
data,  misleading  marking  practices,  and
lapses in regulatory mechanisms [54-55].
Historically, reversal can be seen as an
emerging threat since the early 1990s and a
consequence of the success of empiricism.
Prior to the 1940s and the advent of the ran-
domized  trial  [56],  pathophysiologic  ap-
proaches  to  clinical  problems  dominated
allopathic medicine. Good scientific theories
needed to be both consistent and compre-
hensive. Consistent in that the theories rec-
onciled  real  world  observations  and
comprehensive in that they made sense of a
diverse collection of data. The best clinical
medicine could achieve was congruity with
the leading models of the human body in
health and disease. The dominance of prac-
tice was not shaken until the early 1990s,
when trials such as CAST [7] showed that
the very best rationale could yield treatment
that harmed patients. A mechanistic under-
standing of science, no matter how robust,
does not guarantee empiric verification. This
principle has served as precondition for the
era of medical reversal.
The coNveNTioNAl vieW ANd A
NeW sTANdARd
Despite this historical shift, in current
practice we continue to adopt new technolo-
gies not because they are supported by the
strongest evidence base, but based on a com-
474 Prasad and Cifu: Medical reversalmon sense appeal that they should work
[57]. We can extend “common sense” to sig-
nify any set of surrogate data trials, basic
science rationale, or observational results.
There is direct evidence that this permissive
attitude is true of approval processes. Red-
berg and colleagues note that only 27 per-
cent of new cardiac devices were tested in
randomized fashion prior to U.S. Food and
Drug Administration (FDA) approval [58].
In light of theses considerations, the pre-
vailing attitude must be reconsidered. A com-
mon sense standard that a treatment will work
can no longer justify its adoption. Twenty
years into the era of evidence-based medicine
[59], we must recommit to practicing based
on good evidence. In general, this means that
well-done RCTs should be done before new
technologies are adopted. Well-done means
that in addition to strong methodology, ade-
quate power, and blinding, such trials are ap-
propriately  controlled  (in  certain  cases,
sham-controlled) and address proper end-
points. What counts as appropriate control
and proper endpoints is beyond the scope of
this paper, and a subject that can be debated,
but it almost certainly involves outcomes that
are important in and of themselves. A hemo-
globin A1c level is not something that is in it-
self meaningful; diabetic mortality (largely
from cardiovascular causes and stroke) and
diabetic  end-organ  damage  (retinopathy,
nephropathy, neuropathy) are. Hypertension
is a silent killer. Silent in that patients don’t so
much care about it, as its consequences. Thus,
the popularity of Atenolol was particularly
shameful: the treatment of a silent surrogate
marker that never achieved its intended goal
of helping patients live longer.
soMe ReveRsAl Will Be 
iNeviTABle
A  recommitment  to  evidence-based
medicine will not eliminate reversal. Large,
well-done RCTs do represent the strongest
truth claim in all of the sciences [60], but
they are not beyond the reach of refutation.
Reliance on strong evidence, however, will
greatly diminish the frequency of reversal,
and this itself would be an incredible feat.
We propose raising the bar for the adop-
tion of new medical practices. Others have
made similar appeals [58], and one author
advises physicians to practice irrespective of
FDA approval, demanding a higher standard
in  their  practices  [61].  However,  to  our
knowledge, we are the first who have de-
fined the consequences of reversal as incen-
tive for this change. It will likely require
both a strong professional ethic and central-
ized regulation to achieve meaningful re-
sults.  
Currently, the standards for device ap-
proval remain below that of pharmaceutical
drugs. Medical devices are less likely to
have demonstrated safety prior to approval
[62], and very few have efficacy shown in
large randomized controlled trials [58]. For
these reasons, one may speculate that rever-
sal occurs more frequently among medical
devices and that the reforms we have sug-
gested will affect that industry more deeply.
Such a view is plausible; however, approval
for medications often also includes a sea of
uncertainty — the reliance of surrogate end-
point studies, placebo lead in periods, and a
shift to controversial endpoints such as “pro-
gression free survival.” Thus, it is hard to
say whether devices or drugs harbor more
uncertainly and where reversal might be de-
terred more frequently.
Instead of raising the bar for new tech-
nologies, one might contend that we simply
become better at managing reversal. Con-
tradicted practices should be more rapidly
removed, and physicians should be careful
to advise patients of the uncertainty in a
practice. Proponents of this view understand
that it requires continual reassessment [57].
“[A]s evidence subsequently accumulates,
physicians must be prepared to reevaluate
even a long-standing clinical practice” [57].
However, as we have argued, the inertia of a
contradicted therapy extends beyond alter-
able considerations such as finances. Inertia
makes this position untenable. 
The cost of performing upfront studies
may be seen as another barrier to our pro-
posal. However, looked at a different way,
higher upfront standards would significantly
cut costs. Sixty-four patients and 40 control
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vertebroplasty is not a useful therapy. Over
the course of the decade preceding these tri-
als, thousands of patients underwent the pro-
cedure paid for by Medicare alone [63]. The
cost of conducting the New England Jour-
nal of Medicine studies was trivial compared
to  the  cost  of  the  procedure  across  the
United States in the preceding years. While
large payers clearly have the biggest incen-
tive in funding such trials, makers of verte-
broplasty  equipment  (and  cement)  and
administering practitioners (interventional
radiologists) have the deepest obligation.
Our discussion has centered on new
technologies, but a related issue is how to
deal with existing, unverified practices. A
systematic and stepwise method of trials is
required to uncover as-of-yet unknown re-
versals. A systematic way would be to pri-
oritize  interventions  by  cost  burden.  To
understand the idea of “stepwise,” consider
the case of minimally invasive laminectomy
for chronic low back pain, which is widely
performed in the United States today [64].
Initially, trials may compare surgery with
sham-surgery among patients with pain, but
without paraesthesia or other neurological
sequellae. However, if such trials result in
reversal, further studies expanding the po-
tential territory of contradiction would be
warranted. 
Medicine has a moral obligation to hold
itself accountable to the highest method-
ological standards of the time that are rea-
sonably feasible, practical, and ethical prior
to widespread implementation of new ther-
apies. Reversal serves as a reminder that
failing to do so, risks deep and lasting dam-
age. Amid the many important topics of
health care reform, we must revisit funda-
mental questions: How do we want the prac-
tice of medicine to advance? Do we want a
profession that incrementally moves toward
the good and helpful? Or one that stutters
and  stops,  goes  back  and  forth,  moving
steadfastly toward the expensive and new?
A sustainable, reasonable, and honest medi-
cine must be the former. Early upfront test-
ing would be a boon to both patients and
doctors alike.
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